Thursday, October 30, 2008

Melamine alert: Fishy.


In case you were wondering, the plastic-y contaminant hasn't gone away. Although candy lovers can take heart knowing that White Rabbit is back on the shelves (along with signs that say something to the effect of "Now melamine-free, we swear!"), four Chinese egg brands have been found contaminated with the chemical, and Shanghai is inspecting fish feed at 10 local plants. The addition of melamine to animal feed has been a common practice and an "open secret" across China for years, an anonymous insider was quoted as saying in the Nanfang Daily, Xinhua News Service and, tellingly, the CPP's mouthpiece of choice, The People's Daily (tellingly because this is the same news source that disarmingly reported THE NEW MILK IS TOTALLY OKAY, GUYS--NOTHING TO SEE HERE. So if they're reporting bad news...the news is pretty bad).

The government has put new regulations in place officially limiting the amount of melamine allowed in food products and is promising better inspections and tougher penalties. But the emerging cases of contamination demonstrate both how widespread melamine's use has been as a false protein booster, and how deep the cover-up got. Dalian Hanwei Enterprise Group, the country's leading egg processor and one of the four with melamine in its eggs, has said it was alerted to the melamine contamination Sept. 27--almost a month before it went public with the problem. It appears both the Chinese government and the dairy companies themselves were aware of the milk-powder contamination months before the products were recalled in early September.

Not exactly reassuring news if you're buying, well, just about anything edible that could maybe contain something from China.

One interesting result of the whole melamine scandal, though, is that at least two private lawsuits have come out of it. This wouldn't seem strange in almost any other country, but civil suits are extremely rare here. Thanks both to a capricious court system--put it this way: It makes George W. Bush's judicial appointments look like a hands-off approach--and low levels of consumer activism and outrage, you just don't see people turning around to sue the company that sold them a faulty stereo/car/bicycle/non-earthquake-proof school for their kids.

Or at least, you didn't.

But two lawsuits have emerged from the fallout of the melamine scandal: One involves parents from Guangdong whose 11-month-old son who developed kidney stones after drinking Sanlu's milk--they're claiming $132,000 in compensation from the dairy company; the other was launched by parents from Henan, suing Sanlu for $22,000 after their 14-month-old son got kidney stones. Lawyers involved in both cases have complained of government pressure to withdraw the suits, and as far as I can tell it still isn't clear if the regional courts will allow the cases to go through. If they do, however, that's pretty huge: It will mean not only that the widespread contamination scandal has touched a raw enough nerve that people are acting on their anger; it also means they feel empowered enough--and have enough confidence in the court system--to act on it through legal challenges.

(Conversely, several families, apparently equally outraged but with less faith in China's tolerance for lawsuits, are bringing their case to the United States: Qingdao Shengyuan Milk Co. Ltd., a Qingdao-based company whose products were found to contain melamine, has a subsidiary in Delaware, and the families have gotten themselves a Maryland lawyer to help them pursue the case. Interesting. And legalistically convoluted.)



In the meantime, I'm going to hope my kidneys have a reeeeaaallllly high plastic tolerance.


Tuesday, October 28, 2008

Congratulations, Leslie Feist

I heard your (once beautifully whimsical, now aggravatingly associated with iPods) counting song emanating from a closet-sized electronics store in Wujiaochang this evening.

It was a lovely bit of nostalgia; the only other Canadian music I've heard here is Celine Dion blasting from a Papa John's. Western culture exported at its finest, ladies and gentlemen.

Saturday, October 25, 2008

Urban jungle and green-space oases

For a 20 million-person metropolis that throws around new skyscrapers the way Israeli politicians throw around petulant ultimata, Shanghai has some pretty sweet green spaces.

In aggregate they make up an odd assortment of traditional Chinese gardens (mostly renovated, originally imperial-style but now tourist-style); colonial gardens built by the European powers that lorded it over Shanghai during the late 19th and early 20th centuries; and new, sterile-looking modern gardens, with lots of stone slabs and oddly placed neon things.

But the coolest park in the city, at least by people-watching standards, is Fuxing Park. You really wouldn't think it would be all that pleasant: The place was designed by the French when they ruled the roost in the French Concession, and it looks a lot like the Jardin de Luxembourg--right down to that tiered, round fountain. Very weird.

But in the intervening 160(ish) years it has been reclaimed by locals.

On a weekend afternoon it's swarming with Shanghainese gambling loudly, practicing Tai Chi or ballroom dancing and inscrutably fishing for goldfish they buy from a stand beside the pond (I swear, I'm not making this up). Children rollerblade around the water fountain with a reckless abandon that would make Haussmann apoplectic.

Love it--我爱这个.

What's most fascinating about parks in Shanghai, though, is their anomalously cultivated nature: These manicured lawns, meticulously placed rock sculptures surrounding fake-as-you-can-get fishponds overlooked by park benches, are weird oases of calm in a frantic urban jungle. The wild stuff is skyscraper city--undulating glass and oddly angular concrete structures, contrasted with the tame public parks.

For a Canuck raised in a place where "the wild" was enormous conifers and crashing surf, that's a pretty drastic reversal.

Weird. But very cool.


















Monday, October 20, 2008

'Wipe out reactionaries thoroughly and completely!'


It seems fitting that Shanghai's Propaganda Poster Museum is the city's least publicized, hardest-to-find tourist destination.

The three adjoining rooms, plus a tiny gift shop, are down a grey hall at the bottom of a bare set of stairs in the basement of an apartment building--one of four nondescript brick structures in a complex just off Huasheng Lu, a street on the edge of the French Concession.

The place is run by an enthusiastic, bespectacled man who claims the hundred-odd posters constitute the largest collection of their kind in China. It took him 14 years to amass his impressive array of luridly colourful testaments to 30 years of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda campaign, and he's visibly proud of the exhibits. (For those into propaganda-related memorabilia, he also has old-school, ultra-rare magazines from North Korea. I confess I have as intense a yellowing-newsprint fetish as the next journo-nerd. But the prices were too steep for my kwai-thirsty pockets, and I stocked up on postcards instead.)

The posters on display range chronologically from 1949, when a flushed-with-success Red Army declared a new, utopian era in Chinese history, to 1979, when Mao's successor Hua Guofeng was trying to make himself the focal point in new, equally adulatory "big character" posters (the result is far less impressive). The trail ends there, when Deng Xiaoping ended the big character craze shortly after coming to power. The vast majority of the posters were totally destroyed after that--kind of embarrassing for a country in the process of opening to have hard-core Cultural Revolution, kill-the-rightists-and-American-imperialists posters kicking around, they figured.

The harsh anti-rightist and anti-U.S. invective was impressive, and kind of scary: The grasping, hook-nosed (come on, was that touch really necessary?) Americans look positively alien with their claws, scales and sometimes green-tinged skin. Many sport bloody bandages--from wounds obviously inflicted by the strapping, clean-cut Communist workers, parading across the poster armed with shovels and a look of determination. It's clear these patriots are going to boost the country's iron production or die trying. In most cases it was the latter--one minor flaw in that otherwise brilliant plan is that people can't eat iron.

In some ways, though, the less hard-core posters are a little like zealous public service announcements: Carry out family planning and birth control for the revolution!








The most fascinating are the posters that illustrate Party infighting--several called for the execution of Deng Xiaoping (you know, the guy who took over after Mao and is almost as big a name as the Great Leader himself) as part of the power struggle after Mao's death. 'Cause he was a rightist and counter-revolutionary, right?

It almost makes Canada's Liberal leadership race seem civil in comparison.

(Apology/disclaimer: I wasn't supposed to take photos and the posters were all under gross reflective glass, so these are all really crappy.)

The (propaganda) play's the thing


At my last pedagogically questionable excursion to Weiliao Xiaoxue, after a rollicking session of English-language introductions with threescore Grade Twos

("What's your name?"

"What's your name?"

"No, no--Zhe yiwei, 'Ni jiao shenme mingze?' 'Wo jiao ... shenme, shenme, shenme.' Nimen shuo, 'My name is ... shenme, shemne, shenme.' Hao bu hao?"

"Hao!"

"OK. What's...your...name?"

"What's...your...name?"

"Crap.")

we moved on to the nine- and 10-year-old English interest group, where the previous week the students had voted to perform Cinderella. I had dutifully put together a qualitatively questionable script that tried to be both interesting and easy to learn, and mostly failed on both counts. Then before our session the laoshi approached us, looking concerned. The students were supposed to perform the play at a Christmas-y winter celebration sponsored by foreigners (no, none of these kids are Christian. But the foreigners are. Please don't ask me why that makes sense). The theme was environmental protection. Could we incorporate that into the play?

Of course we could.

She looked delighted, and left, only to return a moment later, looking concerned again. Could the play's narration be in Chinese, to make it easier to understand?

Sure--no problem. Fabulous.

But the look of concern returned: Could the play be about Expo 2010, the upcoming multi-million-dollar international bout of nuttiness that local officials are treating like Shanghai's own Olympics (and about which I will write a real post when I have more time)?

I looked at my partner and burst out laughing. She and the teacher looked at me in consternation.

Of course. Of course it can be about Expo. Mei guanxi, mei guanxi.

So now I'm writing a play about how the government-organized Expo--which is fascinating but complex and is displacing entire communities as a massive construction project erects enormous, wavy buildings on the shore of the Huangpu just south of Lujiazui's eerie skyscrapers--is helping the environment and truly fulfilling its slogan, "Better city, better life."

How fabulous is that?

Saturday, October 18, 2008

I *Communist heart* CHINA MORE THAN EVER


Don't you?

I've seen these T-shirts everywhere and am almost positive they're made for tourists but only locals wear them. I love it.

Friday, October 17, 2008

Shaoxing redemption


Fudan University, in its all-encompassing wisdom, decided what our program needed was a trip to Shaoxing, an ancient canal city a few hours' drive south of Shanghai, in Zhejiang province.

Shaoxing has remade itself in the past two decades as a centre of industry and manufacturing, and is now the tie capital of the world (take that, Italy and South Korea!), among other things. It accomplished this through the magic of China's unique brand of free-market economic development (it's remarkable how a loosening of restrictions and a couple of tax breaks for key industries will trigger a "market-driven" economic boom).

It's also the birthplace of Lu Xun, a famed Chinese writer from the early 20th century who is beloved not only for his writing but also for his social activism and criticism of government corruption in a post-Yuan Shikai China (I've been assured he also hated the Guomindang, and would have adored Mao Zedong if he hadn't died in 1936, 13 years before Liberation in 1949).


For the approximately 33 hours we were in Shaoxing, we were herded from one tour or lecture or organized meal to another. It was very strange, but also englightening: Our tours and lectures were all led by local government officials whom we couldn't really talk to but who were officious and friendly and assured us that this was a shining example of the successful marriage of heritage preservation and modernization, leading to a wealthy, beautiful municipality that attracts oodles of tourists and foreign investors.

The plethora of tourists was visibly evident when we got a tour of Lu Xun's birthplace and the tomb of this dude called Da Yu (literally Big Yu, or Yu the Great), who's a kind of Chinese Noah and saved the country from a bunch of floods around 4,000 years ago.

We got a taste of the foreign investment landscape when checking out a high-tech electronics factory that designs cool stuff like the touch screens on cell phones and crazy high-definition flatscreen televisions. They make things to order for big brand-name companies, who then turn around and sell them at a grossly inflated price.

All the workers were wearing these bizarre biohazard-type suits. 70 per cent of the company's 600 employees are migrants from other provinces, and they live in dormitories on-site. They get 1,400 to 1,800 RMB per month, which is more than minimum wage but not amazing (it's about $300 CDN, now that the dollar has slipped majorly).

The most hilarious part of the trip, though, and unfortunately the least discussed by our effusive tour guides, was our accomodation: We were put up in a Party school, which is where CCP members go when they're being promoted to "learn to love the Party more," as one of the Fudan students explained it to me. The school was located outside the city in a surprisingly North American-looking suburb (there were more private, standalone houses than I've seen anywhere outside rural Xinjiang, except these ones were enormous), which the student said is necessary because the Party schools are so luxuriant they don't want people to get resentful.

The compound consisted of a series of blindingly white buildings, a basketball court, running track, a gleaming gymnasium with a bunch of badminton courts, a two-storey militaristic cafeteria with predictably caf-like food and a series of lecture buildings. The dormitories where Party members-in-training live for the two months they attend CCP ideology lectures here all had ensuite bathrooms, fancy sheets, those weird packaged slippers, teakettles and surprisingly soft mattresses for a country that doesn't really do soft mattresses.

We kept running into Party members in the caf or heading to or from their dormitories or the basketball court, but no one would talk to us. Very, very strange.


Monday, October 13, 2008

Rural develo-whaaa?


So this is kind of a big deal.

You would think that for a 9.6-million-square-kilometre country, more than half of whose 1.4-billion people are still registered as "peasants," rural development would be a no-brainer.

Not so much.

When Deng Xiaoping launched a raft of economic reforms when he came to power in 1978, he purposely planned for uneven development--the idea was to experiement with market liberalism in select pockets of the country (hello, Shenzhen) and, if that worked, to expand that elsewhere. Fair enough. But the economic development and investment incentives both central and local governments poured into urban areas like Shanghai never reached the rural and remote swaths of the country, where people farm more or less the same way they did hundreds of years ago. This wouldn't be an issue if post-reform social stratification didn't (for lack of a less crude, equally effective term) completely screw over rural peasants quite as much, on quite as many levels, as it has. China, in case you were wondering, has one of the most drastic urban-rural income gaps in the world. For a country that three decades ago was hard-core Communist, that's pretty huge.

In part this uneven economic development was a purposeful decision: When you have more than a billion mouths to feed, it makes sense (or it did at the time, anyway) to keep food prices low and deprive farmers of much power to change the way they do business--hence the restrictive hukou household registration system that endeavours to keep people in their region of origin. This neat little social-control device is supposed to keep Anhui farmers farming in Anhui, Shangdong farmers farming in Shangdong, and Beijing businessmen doing business in Beijing. Etcetera.

But despite the hardships breaking hukou imposes, 100-million migrant workers are leaving the country every year to work in the cities. Without urban hukou they don't get health care, social security or education for their kids, and unless they have a special work permit they're subject to arrest or at least losing their job if officials bother to check. But they go because no matter how crappy their living situation in the slums of Shanghai or Beijing, and no matter how far below the 8RMB/hour minimum wage they're paid, it's way better than what they would get living in the countryside.

Short story long, the past weekend's decisions should mean big things for China's rural population: In addition to promising to provide basic services that by law should be available to everyone already, the government will now allow peasants to sell their land rights. This is big news (the NYT explains why far better than I do) because until now, farming has been restricted to small plots of land controlled by local and regional governments. Under the proposed changes, peasants could sell--or at least transfer the rights to--their land to companies and other private entities, or at least pool their land resources so they could make better use of it and actually make enough money to support themselves and their families.

This seems kind of counter-intuitive to someone whose higher education consisted in large part of burning Milton Friedman in academic effigy, but at the very least the new measures should add new incentives to modernization of agriculture--something that has been an issue since Sun Yat-Sen's heyday--and hopefully address the problem of how to feed a nation whose farmers are booking it to the city for lack of cash.

At least, Hu Jintao certainly hopes so.

Sunday, October 12, 2008

Incredible generosity, or just really poor judgment of character?


So this Uyghur family adopted me while I was in Xinjiang.

They invited me into their home, fed me, showed me around their hometown and their family's houses.


Why did they do this? I have no idea.

But it was a fantastic way to see the region, to get to know the local culture and to be treated wonderfully by astonishingly (foolishly) kind people who didn't seem to mind that my knowledge of their language was limited to "Thank you," "Hello," "Yes/No" and "Where is the bus station?" (for reasons I needn't expound upon, I also picked up "You are very crazy").


Luckily for me, one of the family's daughters is majoring in English in university and translated for me as I gawped and muttered gratefully and cluelessly around their home. She also showed me around Gulja/Yining, where she and most of her family live (her extended family, though, is scattered around much of the province). It's a city she has seen change drastically since her childhood--some changes she likes, and some that make her visibly uneasy.

I also got to attend a dinner celebrating the end of Ramadan at the family matriarch's house just outside Gulja, which was incredible. The woman lives in a traditional Uyghur house, with a courtyard housing cows and a fruit tree; two of her children and their families live nearby--her daughter's house across the street is piled high with corn left out to dry.


This family had lived in Xinjiang for generations, and could trace their family back hundreds of years. They seemed more culturally than religiously observant, but were staunch defenders of their own language and identity, and feared its assimilation. At the same time, they talked about wanting to go abroad or to Beijing or Shanghai to study, work or travel, and wanted Xinjiang to get the same economic benefits as the rest of the country.


They also see a disconcertingly clear divide between Chinese ethnic groups, which seems to be a trend everywhere I go: Even in cosmopolitan Shanghai, people differentiate between other Chinese based on ethnicity and dialect, which indicates their province of origin. It isn't a big deal in most cases, but in Xinjiang, especially, there seems to be a trust issue when it comes to interactions with people not of one's own origins.





In a weird way, being abysmally foreign actually helps in terms of getting people to trust me, because I'm so idiotically clued-out as to be pleasantly harmless.

Or maybe I just tell myself that to make myself feel better.























Friday, October 10, 2008

A province lost in translation (oh, and also ethnic tension)


Xinjiang is a wild, beautiful, fascinating place whose apparent multiple-personality disorder only makes it more intriguing.

It's also surprisingly hospitable to ignorant weiguoren who can't speak the language.

Um, not that I would know, or anything.

China's northwestern frontier is a vast landscape of desert and mountains, and has never been as fully absorbed into the main country as most other provinces. Its Muslim Uyghurs are the most prominent of the 13 ethnic minorities who live there. They used to comprise the majority of Xinjiang's population but now make up about half the province's 20 million people--the result of successful programs to move Han Chinese into the region as Beijing pumps economic development programs into the province, and pumps oil out of it.


Travelling through Xinjiang feels a bit like inhabiting two parallel universes: Each place has two names--one Uyghur and one Chinese--so if you go to the Han receptionist at a bus station and tell her you want to go to Bourtela, she looks at you with total incomprehension until a passerby takes pity on you and gets you a ticket to "Bole." If you ask a Uyghur minibus driver if he can take you back to Yining, he gives you a dirty look and drives off, leaving you stranded until you find someone who will take you to "Gulja."

Even more perilous is telling the time: Although officially Xinjiang, like every other Chinese province, is on Beijing time, locals are on "Xinjiang time," which is two hours earlier. This kind of makes sense--the distance is farther than that between Vancouver and Toronto--but throws you off completely because all the bus and train stations will run on one time, and taxis, restaurants and stores will have something completely different. Because my sense of time is total crap, I spent much of the week feeling like I was stuck in a time warp.


I arrived in Urumqi (Wulumuqi in Chinese) Sunday afternoon, fresh off the train and completely disoriented. I remained so for most of my time there (well realistically I was pretty disoriented the entire week. But who's keeping track?).



The bustling provincial capital is more of a 21st-century metropolis than a sixth-century Silk Road trading post, but it's still a major hub of commerce.

Except now, the major structures are Chinese banks and office buildings for

petrochemical companies--the bazaars, with skinned dead goats strung upside-down alongside carts of raisins and stacks of metal pots, are still around but off the main streets. Both the petrochem CEOs and the goat-sellers have cell phones.

Almost all the signs here are bilingual--in Chinese and Uyghur, a Turkic language whose writing looks a lot like Arabic--and many are trilingual: The far north and west of the province are home to sizable Kazakh and Mongol minorities, and many of the signs are in Mongolian, as well. Some of the more ritzy touristy places had Russian-language signage. I of course understood none of this, and my ability to read Chinese-language street signs grew immensely. So did my tolerance for being extremely lost for long periods of time.


From Urumqi I went to Gulja (Yining in Chinese) via sleeper bus, which was an exercise in uncomfortable insomnia: I made the mistake of getting a top bunk, which is cheaper but which means even someone as godawful short as myself doesn't have enough headspace to sit up. I spent most of the 12-hour ride listening to the snores of my fellow passengers and peering out the window across the aisle at distant lights of mystery municipalities.


Luckily the squeaky contraption made pit stops every couple of hours so I could stagger off, dance around in the cold night air, take photos of the nearby gas station and pretend I has as much street cred as the Uyghur men who stood around smoking.



Gulja is a lot prettier than Urumqi, and a little less harried-feeling. It's also a telling product of Beijing's plan for large-scale western development, which has brought foreign investment and business from Inner China pouring in. The city's divided almost in half at the bus station: On one side is the modern, upscale new neighbourhood, populated primarily by Han Chinese; on the other is the older area, where most of Gulja's Uyghur population lives. Although Gulja's economy has grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade, some Uyghurs say they aren't benefitting from the boost, and are just hit by higher prices thanks to inflation.

Gulja/Yining was the site of violent riots in 1997, when Uyghur and Kazakh separatists took to the streets in clashes that killed several people while wounding dozens more. More than a decade later, the modernizing city still bears some of the scars from the ensuing clampdown: Extreme security measures are still in place and some Uyghur residents I spoke with say they still feel like suspect terrorists by default--especially since the attacks in western Xinjiang around the Olympics this year.



Just a few minutes outside the city centre, traditional Uyghur houses--rooms surrounding an open courtyard, with doors featuring traditional painting and metalwork--line an unpaved road, their courtyards overflowing with corn spread out to dry, often covered with a tarp to keep the household goats from getting to them.

When I was there everyone was celebrating Eid--visiting each other and, in the men's case, going to mosque and to the cemetery to pay respects to deceased relatives (the cemeteries here are separate, too). Beijing has been keeping a much closer eye on religious activity in Xinjiang since the August attacks, and people here aren't sure when stricter restrictions on things like mosque attendance and religious practice by public officials will be lifted.

There's a definite aura of mutual distrust between Uyghur and Han here--there's little mixing, and what interactions there are seem coloured by the expectation on both sides that they're in danger of being ripped off or somehow betrayed. It's very strange.

From Gulja/Yining, it's an eight-hour bus ride through the Tian Shan mountains to Bourtela/Bole. The bus winds along a precarious, dirt-and-stone road, passing construction workers building a wider paved road that will tunnel through the mountains when it's finished (I think it's a testament to my distinctly Canadian brand of racism that whenever I see Chinese people building major transportation routes through mountain ranges under questionable safety and working conditions, I think of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Yeah, I'm an terrible person).


We passed Sayram Lake, a gorgeous and impossibly blue body of water near Bourtela/Bole. I had time to run out, take a photo and prance around before the bus left without me and I had to chase it down or be left with the yurts, bulldozers and tourist stand.

Bourtela and Oursan/Wenquan, which is apparently famous for its really boring hot springs, weren't super interesting. But getting to and from the cities was an experience and a half, which kind of encapsulates what the entire trip was like.

The area southeast of Urumqi is another world altogether--oil derricks and windmills dot the desert landscape, and the crazy rock formations of the Flaming Mountains look like something out of a film set (in fact, part of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon was shot there and people go tour the former set. Cool).

The towns around Turpan are famous for their grapes and their cotton--and, now, their oil. The two industries don't go terribly well together, and a lot of farmers are worried they're being pushed out as their land is bought up for oil exploration and extraction.

Sounds kind of familiar, doesn't it?

The tiny villager of Lianjin was beautiful and fascinating because there were literally oil derricks in people's backyards, and enormous oil trucks would pass three-wheeled taxis on dirt roads. The small-scale grape and cotton farms belonged primarily to traditional Uyghurs who, like just about everyone else I saw that week, couldn't seem to figure out what on earth I was doing there.

Downtown Shanshan/Piqan is bigger, more bustling and boasted a tension that reminded me of Gulja, although not as pronounced. The train station, where I was supposed to catch my ride home, was far out of town and surrounded by oil fields. Around 7 p.m., as I wandered the colourful and grimy streets waiting for my train, uniformed China National Petroleum Company workers flooded the town, coming home from work.

That's when, for some inexplicable reason, I was almost arrested: I was wandering an alleyway marketplace, taking photos of oil workers and minding my own business, when all of a sudden a uniformed policeman grabbed my arm and started speaking to me rapidly in Chinese. He then motioned for me to follow him to a police station across the street. That's when I kind of freaked out--both because I had a train to catch in two hours and because the prospect of a Chinese jail cell was less than appealing.

"Wenti shi shenme?" I kept asking--what's the problem? But he either didn't answer or I didn't understand, and I had no choice to follow him into the station. I managed to communicate that I was a foreigner and couldn't speak Chinese, and he brought his supervisor over. The man shook my hand cordially--"How do you do?"--and asked me where I was from and what I was doing.

For some reason the fact that I was Canadian--"Wo shi Jianadaren!"--and my impending train convinced him to let me go. He wouldn't tell me why they had dragged me in there in the first place, and to be honest I wasn't all that keen to stick around and ask.







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